@article{Pahl2018b,

title = {Graph-based IoT microservice security},

author = {Marc Oliver Pahl and Fran\c{c}ois Xavier Aubet and Stefan Liebald},

doi = {10.1109/NOMS.2018.8406118},

isbn = {9781538634165},

year  = {2018},

date = {2018-01-01},

journal = {IEEE/IFIP Network Operations and Management Symposium: Cognitive Management in a Cyber World, NOMS 2018},

pages = {1--3},

abstract = {The Internet of Things (IoT) can be considered as Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) of Microservices ($mu$S). The $mu$Ss inherently process data that affects the privacy, safety, and security of its users. IoT service security is a key challenge. Most state of the art providing IoT system security is policy based. We showcase a graph-based access control that runs as module on IoT nodes, or in the network. Our solution intercepts and firewalls inter-service communication. It automatically creates a model of legitimate communication relationships. The model is interactively updated via a simple-to-understand interface. Our solution adds inevitable IoT security to existing IoT systems .},

keywords = {Autonomous service management, firewall, IoT, Mi-croservices, Passive monitoring, Security, Unattended nodes},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{Foley2017,

title = {Getting security objectives wrong: A cautionary tale of an industrial control system},

author = {Simon N Foley},

doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-71075-4_3},

issn = {16113349},

year  = {2017},

date = {2017-01-01},

journal = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)},

volume = {10476 LNCS},

pages = {18--29},

abstract = {We relate a story about an Industrial Control System in order to illustrate that simple security objectives can be deceptive: there are many things that can and do go wrong when deploying the system. Rather than trying to define security explicitly, this paper takes the position that one should consider the security of a system by comparing it against others whose security we consider to be acceptable: Alice is satisfied if her system is no less secure than Bob's system.},

keywords = {cyber physical system, firewall, ind, SCADA, Security},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{Foley2017a,

title = {Getting security objectives wrong: A cautionary tale of an industrial control system},

author = {Simon N Foley},

doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-71075-4_3},

issn = {16113349},

year  = {2017},

date = {2017-01-01},

journal = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)},

volume = {10476 LNCS},

pages = {18--29},

abstract = {We relate a story about an Industrial Control System in order to illustrate that simple security objectives can be deceptive: there are many things that can and do go wrong when deploying the system. Rather than trying to define security explicitly, this paper takes the position that one should consider the security of a system by comparing it against others whose security we consider to be acceptable: Alice is satisfied if her system is no less secure than Bob's system.},

keywords = {cyber physical system, firewall, ind, SCADA, Security},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}